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In this paper, we survey the theoretical and empirical literature to investi-
gate why nominal wages can be downwardly rigid. Looking back from the
19th century until recently, we first examine the existence and extent of
downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) for several countries. We find
that (1) nominal wages were flexible in the 19th century and the first half
of the 20th century, but (2) nominal wages were downwardly rigid in
almost all the industrialized countries in the second half of the 20th 
century, although (3) the extent of DNWR varied from country to country.
Next, we use a behavioral economics framework to explain the reasons 
for DNWR. We also explain why the existence and extent of DNWR 
varied between time periods and/or from country to country, focusing on
differences in the labor market characteristics (such as labor mobility and
employment protection legislation) and in the macroeconomic environment
(such as economic growth and inflation), which can alter employees’ and
firms’ perceptions toward nominal wage cuts.
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In this paper, we survey the theoretical and empirical literature to investigate why
nominal wages can be downwardly rigid even when wage cuts are needed.
Using longitudinal data on individual employees, Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a, b)
show that nominal wages for full-time employees in Japan were downwardly rigid over
the period from 1993 to 1998. Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b), however, also show
that Japan’s nominal wages have had a small extent of downward rigidity relative to
other countries. Furthermore, based on the aggregated data on establishments, Kuroda
and Yamamoto (2005) show that downward rigidity in nominal wages for full-time
employees was observed until 1997 in Japan, but seemed to disappear after that. What
factors can account for these differences in the extent of downward nominal wage 
rigidity (DNWR) between different time periods and/or from country to country?
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we first observe long-term time-
series data on prices and nominal wages and give an overview of the previous literature
on DNWR. We show that the existence and extent of DNWR vary with the era or time
period analyzed as well as with the country. Specifically, we show that from the 19th
century to the first half of the 20th century nominal wages were flexible in Japan, the
United States, and the United Kingdom, while in the second half of the 20th century
they were downwardly rigid in many industrialized countries, including the three just
named. We also show that the extent of DNWR differed from country to country and
that Japan’s nominal wages were considerably less rigid than those of other countries. In
Section III, we consider the reasons why nominal wages can be downwardly rigid. We
briefly survey the theoretical research since Keynes (1936), and then apply a behavioral
economics framework, which has received considerable attention in recent years, to
consider the reasons for DNWR. In Section IV, we posit a possibility that differences in
the existence and extent of DNWR, between time periods and/or from country to
country, can be attributed to differences in the labor market characteristics (such as
labor mobility and employment protection legislation) and in the macroeconomic 
environment (such as economic growth and inflation), which can alter employees’ and
firms’ perceptions (social norms) toward nominal wage cuts. Section V concludes.
II. Times Series and Country Comparison of DNWR
A. Long-Term Time-Series Data Observations
Were nominal wages downwardly rigid during the past periods of low inflation or deflation?
To find out, we look at long-term time-series data on the inflation rate and rate of nominal
wage change in three countries: Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
1
Figure 1 plots the inflation rate and rate of nominal wage change from 1850 until
2003 for those three countries.
2Several trends common to all three countries are evident
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1. Because of aggregation bias, it is impossible to accurately gauge whether DNWR exists by observing only changes
in the average value of aggregated data on nominal wages. As will be explained later, DNWR is often studied by
using data at a lower aggregation level for this reason.
2. We combine several available statistical series to show the long-term time series for each country. One should note
that some of the older statistical series may not be as accurate as they are now.47
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(Continued on next page)from the figure. The first is the movement of the inflation rate and rate of nominal 
wage change until the mid-20th century. That is, prior to the mid-20th century in the
United States and the United Kingdom, the probabilities for a positive and negative
inflation rate seem to be even, and when the inflation rate was negative, so was the 
rate of nominal wage change. The same trend was also evident in Japan, although 
somewhat more volatile, and there were several periods prior to the mid-20th century
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Figure 1  (continued)
Note: The details for wage data are as follows:
Japan: For 1850–82, the annual regular wages for manufacturers of Choshi soy
sauce manufacturing (excluding food and other special allowances;
weighted average for brewers, foremen, and young workers) noted in 
Saito (1998). For 1883–1939, wages for skilled manufacturing workers 
(A series until 1889, C series after that) noted in Ohkawa, Shinohara, and 
Umemura (1966). For 1959 and later, the amount of scheduled cash wages
(for regular male workers) noted in the Basic Survey on Wage Structure.
United States: Hourly wages for unskilled labor compiled by Williamson (see below).
United Kingdom: Until 1992, average weekly manufacturing wage noted in
Mitchell (2003b), from 1993, the average wage index from the Labour 
Force Survey.
Sources: Japan: Saito (1998), Ohkawa, Shinohara, and Umemura (1966), and Ministry
of Health, Labour and Welfare, Basic Survey on Wage Structure. 
United States: Mitchell (2003a) and data compiled by Samuel H. Williamson
(http://eh.net/databases/unskilledwage/).
United Kingdom: Mitchell (2003b) and Office for National Statistics, Labour
Force Survey.during which the nominal wage change was negative. The second is the disappearance
of this trend from the mid-20th century. From the 1960s, in particular, inflation
became the normal state in all three countries, and there were virtually no periods in
which the nominal wage change was negative.
In sum, as far as can be seen from the long-term time-series data, prior to the 
mid-20th century the inflation rate and rate of nominal wage change fluctuated 
both above and below zero.
3 These observations suggest that during past periods of low
inflation or deflation, there have been periods when nominal wages have been relatively
flexible, with no indication of downward rigidity, in Japan, the United States, and the
United Kingdom.
B. Literature Using Data from the Mid-20th Century and Before
The possibility that nominal wages were relatively flexible prior to the mid-20th 
century was also pointed out by Gordon (1982) and Sachs (1980). Gordon (1982)
uses aggregate data from the three countries (Japan, the United States, and the United
Kingdom). He divides the data into two periods, the 19th to the mid-20th century
(1873–1940) and the second half of the 20th century (1962–82), and compares the
volatility in nominal wage change. He shows that in all three countries nominal wages
were more flexible in the 19th to mid-20th century than they were in the second half
of the 20th century. Using long-term time-series data from the United States, Sachs
(1980) compares the flexibility of nominal wages for each business cycle and finds
that nominal wages were more flexible in the 19th to mid-20th century (1890–1930)
than they were in the second half of the 20th century (1947–76).
Meanwhile, the literature on nominal wage changes prior to World War II
includes analysis using nominal wage data disaggregated by occupation and business 
establishment. For example, using the U.K. historical nominal wage data of building
craftsmen, compiled by Phelps Brown and Hopkins (1956), Yates (1998) concludes
that there was no DNWR in the 19th century, since frequent nominal wage cuts 
were observed.
4
In the United States, there are several papers analyzing establishment data. Hanes
and James (2003) use the U.S. nominal wage data disaggregated by business estab-
lishment and occupation, and investigate DNWR in the 19th century (1840–91),
when there were several periods of low inflation. They statistically test the shape of the
nominal wage change distribution using the method proposed by Kahn (1997)
5 and
found no DNWR in the 19th century.
There is also research pointing to the possibility that nominal wages have gradually
lost flexibility over time. Hanes (1993), for example, uses the average daily wage 
and hourly wage in the U.S. manufacturing industry during the period 1865–1907.
He finds that nominal wages were relatively flexible in the 19th century but the 
49
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3. The same observation has been made concerning fluctuations in the inflation rate by De Long and Summers
(1986), Nishimura and Teruyama (1990), Bootle (1997), Yoshikawa (2000), and Kitamura (2002).
4. Yates (1998) notes that his results were consistent with Adam Smith’s statement that “the money price of labor rises
in the one [year] and sinks in the other.”
5. Kahn’s (1997) method is to test significant differences in shape between the nominal wage change distribution 
during periods of low inflation and the notional distribution estimated based on the data from periods during
which the DNWR constraint was not binding.flexibility gradually weakened toward the end of that century. Additionally, using 
data on manufacturing establishments in the U.S. state of Ohio covering 1892–93
and 1901–10, Sundstrom (1990) observes some extent of DNWR in 1893 and that
rigidity became even more pronounced after the turn of the century.
Mitchell (1985) examines DNWR in the United States from 1929–30, when the
Great Depression occurred. Using establishment data compiled by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, he finds that a certain percentage of establishments left nominal
wages unchanged,
6 but that there was also a fairly high percentage of establishments
that cut wages by at least 10 percent. Based on this, he argues that nominal wages in
the 1920s and 1930s were fairly flexible compared with the period of low inflation
around 1960.
For Japan, Hashimoto (1984) notes that during the recession of the 1920s, when
consumer prices declined persistently, changes in nominal wages varied considerably
by industry: nominal wages increased consistently in the heavy equipment industry,
but fell sharply in other industries, as seen in the wages of female spinning and 
weaving operators in the cotton industry.
7 He also notes that nominal wages were
adjusted downward relatively flexibly in Japan from the start of the Great Depression
in 1929 until 1931. More specifically, nominal wages were cut primarily in such light
industries as the cotton industry, just as in the 1920s. But there were also quite a few
heavy industry firms that cut nominal wages during this period.
8,9 Furthermore, both
Hashimoto (1984) and Takeda (2002) note that many industries in Japan continued
to experience moderate declines in nominal wages from 1932, when employment
began to recover following the Great Depression.
10
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6. To explain why some business establishments left nominal wages unchanged for the first few years of the Great
Depression, O’Brien (1989) cites passages in the memoirs of the U.S. president at that time, Herbert Hoover, which
indicate the government had policies regulating wage cuts. A press release dated November 21, 1929 contained the
following passage: “The President was authorized by the employers who were present at this morning’s conference
to state on their individual behalf that they will not initiate any movement for wage reduction, and it was their
strong recommendation that this attitude should be pursued by the country as a whole.”
7. Hashimoto’s (1984) observations are mostly based on wage data (C-series) from Ohkawa, Shinohara, and Umemura
(1966), which indicate that wages paid to skilled female spinners and weavers declined by almost 20 percent from
their peak in 1922 until 1929. There was also a persistent downward trend in wages paid for skilled labor in other
sectors, including lumber/wood products and printing. Some research (Takeda [2002] for example) claims, 
however, that DNWR was one cause of the recession in the 1920s.
8. For example, Sumitomo Steel Works stopped giving out special allowances and supplemental pay in 1931, and in
the first half of 1931 cut wages by an average of 23 percent year on year. Yokohama Dock cut nominal wages by 
10 percent by changing working hours from 1929 to 1932, while Mitsubishi Shipbuilding and Engineering had
implemented double-digit reductions in the nominal wages of its factory and group heads by 1930. Shibaura
Engineering Works implemented measures to cut nominal wages for piece workers by 30 percent in 1930
(Hashimoto [1984]).
9. Both Nakamura (1971) and Takeda (2002) also find that in Japan in the early 1930s there were many occupations
subject to nominal wage cuts. The size of these cuts differed based on the employee’s gender; Nakamura (1971),
for example, finds that the size of the nominal wage cut for female industrial workers was considerably larger 
than that for male workers. This can be attributed to several factors. Turnover of the female industrial workforce
was high and many came from farming backgrounds, and thus their wages were very sensitive to changes in the 
farming sector’s wages, which were being affected severely by the depression at the time. On the other hand, the
average years of service of the male industrial workforce had become fairly stable and quite long at the time, which
served to dilute the link between the agricultural and the industrial sectors.
10. According to both Hashimoto (1984) and Takeda (2002), the primary causes of the decline in nominal wages from
1932 may have been that (1) job growth was primarily in the younger age groups, and the resulting change in the
age composition of workers pulled the average wage lower, and (2) there was growing use of low-wage production
schemes, including hiring of temporary workers and outsourcing.51
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11. Odaka (1999) notes that the Japanese government issued a directive to freeze nominal wages from September
1939. Subsequently in 1942, however, the Labor Management in Major Enterprises Directive (Juyo Jigyosho
Romu Kanrirei) mandated a pay raise for all employees once a year and required firms to stipulate three 
standardized amounts for these raises: maximum, standard, and a minimum. Odaka (1999) states that 
this was the impetus for establishing the age-based annual wage increments system (teisho) that Japan has
become known for.
The literature on nominal wage changes in Japan during the 1940s is scarce, due in
part to the lack of data. Among the few, Odaka (1999) finds that the government
intervened aggressively in Japan’s nominal wage-setting process at the end of the
1930s and in the early 1940s, which laid the foundations for today’s annual wage
increments system (teisho).
11 Considering that customary annual wage increments
make nominal wages more prone toward downward rigidity, it is conceivable that
Japan’s nominal wages may have become less flexible around the end of the 1930s and
beginning of the 1940s, whenteisho was introduced.
In sum, the studies based on the data from the mid-20th century and before show
that (1) when comparing the periods before and after the mid-20th century, nominal
wages were more flexible and exhibited less downward rigidity before the mid-20th
century in Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom; (2) nominal wages
have become gradually less flexible and become downwardly rigid over time. Care
must be taken when interpreting these results, however, since these prior studies are
based on historical data that may have problems in terms of accuracy.
C. The 1970s and Later
Next, we survey the literature that examines the existence of DNWR using data from
the 1970s. The issues over DNWR, along with those over the optimal inflation rate,
have been discussed extensively since the 1990s, when many of the industrialized
countries experienced low inflation. The pioneering paper on the subject was
McLaughlin (1994). Subsequently, a series of papers followed in the United States to
deal with the problems inherent in the data and testing methods he used. These
papers use longitudinal data tracking the same business establishments or individuals
with various methods. These were also followed by studies using data from other
industrialized countries, such as Canada, European countries, and Japan. Table 1 
provides a summary of some of this literature.
As is clear from Table 1, most of the literature using data from the 1970s finds the
existence of DNWR. That is, the downward rigidity of nominal wages was a common
thread among industrialized countries from the 1970s, regardless of differences in the
data, the period, or the testing methods.
We also find two important points from Table 1. One is that the extent of 
downward rigidity varies depending on the country analyzed. For example, Altonji 
and Devereux (1999), Fehr and Götte (2005), and Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) 
use similar methods to examine the extent of DNWR in the United States,
Switzerland, and Japan, respectively. Comparing the results, nominal wages in Japan
exhibited considerably less downward rigidity than those in the United States or
Switzerland. The data on Switzerland used by Fehr and Götte (2005) include periods



























































































































Argued that wage cuts were not rare, and wage
change distributions were skewed regardless 
of the level of inflation.
Concluded that DNWR did exist, but the 
aggregated welfare loss from lowering the 
inflation rate should be small.
Confirmed the existence of DNWR by asking
directly about the change in nominal wages
from the previous year instead of nominal 
wage levels each year, and concluded almost 
all wage cuts observed in the PSID were due 
to measurement errors.
Reported estimation results showing that
DNWR emerged as inflation rate declined, 
and this raised the average real wage change
rate by as much as 1 percent.
Found that DNWR existed in the 1970s and
1980s for hourly wages, but only in the 1970s
for monthly wages.
Concluded that almost all wage cuts observed 
in the PSID were due to measurement errors, 
by estimating nominal wage change based on
samples from union members and comparing 
it with the union’s announced wage settlement.
Argued that much of the wage cuts observed in
the PSID were caused by measurement errors,
and wage cuts became extremely rare when 
taking measurement errors into account or
when using an individual firm’s data without 
measurement errors.
Argued that DNWR existed to some extent, and
the optimal inflation rate was about 2.5 percent

































































































































































































































D, M, etc. 
(their own tests)
Others (a version 
of hazard model 
considering measure-













Argued that there was no correlation between
the inflation rate and skewness of distributions,
and the skewness of distributions was 
caused by (1) downward rigidity in real wages,
(2) sample selection bias, and (3) aggregation
bias from the pooling of samples.
Reported that DNWR emerged as inflation
declined, and virtually no wage cuts were
observed in individual firm data without 
measurement errors.
Pointed out the possibility that nominal wages
were generally flexible and it was real wages 
that were downwardly rigid, although the 
nominal wages of some employees could 
be downwardly rigid.
Confirmed that hourly wages exhibited 
downward rigidity as the inflation rate declined.
Argued that almost all wage cuts observed 
were due to measurement errors, and 
downward rigidity was actually quite strong,
using frequently surveyed data and taking 
measurement errors into account.
Confirmed the existence of downward rigidities
not only in regular salaries but also in total 
compensation and payroll including bonuses
and other allowances such as overtime pay,
using establishment data with minimal 
measurement errors.
Found that the majority of downward rigidity
stemmed from measurement errors, rounding
errors, and long-term contracts, and that a 
fraction of nominal wage freezes became 
























































































(when multiple data for 
a single union, used the
hourly wage for the lowest
skill level) and others
Union wage settlements
(when multiple data for 
a single union, used the
hourly wage for the 
lowest skill level)
Union wage settlements
(when multiple data for 
a single union, used the
hourly wage for the 
lowest skill level)
Union wage settlements
(when multiple data for 
a single union, used the
hourly wage for the 
lowest skill level)
Union wage settlements
(when multiple data for 
a single union, used the
hourly wage for the lowest
skill level), hourly wages
D
D


















Found that although a considerable number of 
wage cuts were observed even when using data
with minimal measurement errors, there were also
a considerable number of wage freezes, suggesting
the possibility of DNWR to some extent.
Found that although observing some extent of
downward rigidity in regular wages, wage cuts
were common (about 30 percent of samples in
1996) when including bonuses and overtime
pay, and thus argued that DNWR had minimal
impact on the macroeconomy. 
Confirmed by model estimation that no DNWR
was detected and that the coefficient representing
DNWR in the employment adjustment function
actually caused employment to increase.
Reported estimation results showing that not
only DNWR but also rigidity (upward and 
downward) from menu costs were a cause 
of wage freezes, and that rigidities increased 
the average nominal wage change by a 
maximum of 0.18 percentage point.
Confirmed the existence of small rigidity
(upward and downward) from menu costs 
as well as DNWR.
Showed that DNWR emerged as inflation
declined and the extent of DNWR was larger 
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Showed that DNWR emerged as inflation
declined and that rigidity (upward and 
downward) from menu costs also existed 
to some extent.
Showed that DNWR emerged as inflation
declined.
Confirmed that DNWR existed even under 
near-zero inflation and slow economic growth
by model estimation.
Confirmed the existence of DNWR through 
various methods.
Reported results confirming a strong existence
of DNWR and a possible impact on unemploy-
ment below the 3 percent inflation rate, by 
estimating a model taking account of 
measurement errors and aggregation biases.
Confirmed downward rigidity in both real and
nominal wages, a greater extent of rigidity in
real wages, and a greater extent of real wage
rigidity as inflation increases.
Confirmed a moderate extent of downward
rigidity, by estimating a model taking into
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Confirmed the existence of DNWR in all 
countries, albeit to differing degrees (Spain 
had the lowest degree of downward rigidity 
and Italy the highest).
Found substantial DNWR, but its extent 
gradually diminished over time.
Found the hourly wages of part-time female
employees to be almost perfectly downwardly
rigid, while reporting the regular monthly salary
and annual wages of full-time employees were
downwardly rigid to some extent.
Reconfirmed the results from Kuroda and
Yamamoto (2003a) by estimating a model to
take account of measurement errors and 
other factors.
Reported that the annual wages of full-time
employees were downwardly rigid in 1992–97,
but not from 1998 when the recession deep-
ened (analysis was based on aggregated data
rather than micro data).
Reported that approximately 17 percent of all
samples experienced wage cuts.
Notes: 1. Survey abbreviations are as follows:
• PSID: Panel Study of Income Dynamics (United States) 
• CPS: Current Population Survey (United States)
• CSS: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary Survey (United States)
• SIPP: Survey of Income and Program Participation (United States)
• ECI: Employment Cost Index (United States)
• BHPS: The UK British Household Panel Study (United Kingdom)
• NES: New Earnings Survey (United Kingdom)
• HRDC: Human Resources Development Canada (Canada)
• LMAS: Canadian Labour Market Activity Survey (Canada)

















































































































































Table 1  (continued) 
Notes: 1. • SIF: Social Insurance Files (Switzerland)
• IABS: IAB-Beschaftigtenstichprobe (Germany)
• INPS: Italian Institute for Social Security (Italy)
• ECHP: European Community Household Panel (Euro zone)
• IMSS: Mexican Social Security Institute (Mexico)
• JPSC: Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (Japan)
• BSWS: Basic Survey on Wage Structure (Japan) 
• IILPS: Institute of Industrial and Labor Policies Survey (Japan) 
2. Types of analysis are as follows:
• D: This type of analysis checks for the existence and extent of DNWR by constructing a nominal wage change distribution and observing its shape. This has been used in 
nearly all research. Normally, nominal wages are deemed to be downwardly rigid when the distribution is skewed to the right due to a large number of samples with a 
nominal wage change near zero and a small number of samples with a negative change. 
• M: This type of analysis uses skewness and other statistics to test for the symmetry of the nominal wage change distribution. This has been used in many analyses since
McLaughlin (1994). A detailed explanation of the statistics is provided by McLaughlin (2000). 
• LSW: This type of analysis directly tests for whether there is a relatively smaller portion of the nominal wage change distribution in negative territory, as well as whether there 
is symmetry of the distribution. This was developed by Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher (1995). 
• CH: This type of analysis, used by Card and Hyslop (1997), non-parametrically estimates the counterfactual symmetric nominal wage distributions (those assuming no 
DNWR) and looks at differences from the shape of the observed distributions. This analysis assumes that the right side of the nominal wage change distribution is 
unaffected by downward rigidity and that the left side of the distribution should be symmetric with the right side if nominal wages are not downwardly rigid. 
• K: This type of analysis estimates the shape of the nominal wage change distribution (height of the bars in a histogram) through regression with time-series data, and then 
tests for whether the heights of the bars representing negative nominal wage changes are significantly lower than the heights of bars located the same distance from the
median value on the positive side. Since first proposed by Kahn (1997), this method or improvements thereof has been used in many analyses. This analysis is deemed 
to be a useful method to test for DNWR in the sense that it does not require any assumptions regarding the shape of the notional distribution of nominal wage change 
and thus makes it harder for the analysts to inject their own arbitrary judgments. 
• AD: This type of analysis uses either a friction model or a Tobit model to estimate the structure when the observed nominal wage change is zero if the notional change 
(the theoretically expected change based on the individual characteristics) is between zero and a certain negative threshold, but becomes negative when that threshold 
is exceeded. This approach makes it possible to take account of measurement errors and to compare the extent of DNWR using a uniform measure. Since it was 
developed by Altonji and Devereux (1999), this method or improvements thereof has been used in numerous analyses. Thus, it is unlikely that the observed differences in the extent of DNWR were affected
by the level of inflation. Furthermore, Knoppik and Beissinger (2004), who applied
Kahn’s (1997) method to nominal wage data of the 12 euro zone countries compiled
by the same methods for the same period, find considerable differences in the 
extent of DNWR among countries. What explains these cross-country differences 
in DNWR?
The other important point is that the existence of DNWR varies depending on 
the time period analyzed. Looking at Japan, for example, Kuroda and Yamamoto
(2003a, b) observe the existence of DNWR using longitudinal data on individuals
from 1993–98, whereas Kuroda and Yamamoto (2005) show its disappearance from
1998 using aggregate data on establishments from 1985–2001.
12
Why do the existence and extent of DNWR vary depending on the country and
time period? In Section III, we look to the theoretical literature following Keynes
(1936) as well as behavioral economics, which has attracted growing interest recently,
to discern why nominal wages can become downwardly rigid. Then, in Section IV, we
give some consideration as to what causes the extent of DNWR to differ between time
periods and/or from country to country.
III. Reasons Why Nominal Wages Can Be Downwardly Rigid: 
A Survey of the Theoretical Literature with a Focus on
Prospect Theory
A. Relative Wage Theory
The issue over DNWR dates back to Keynes (1936). His ideas on this point, known
as relative wage theory, can be summarized as follows. First, it is relative wages that
employees are concerned with, so that during economic downturns their resistance to
nominal wage cuts is not really that strong. They do become concerned, however,
when they perceive it is only their wages that are reduced and that their (real) wages
are lowered relative to others. This makes it difficult to adjust nominal wages down-
ward over the short run. On the other hand, people should not resist an across-the-
board decline in real wages resulting from a rise in the general price level, which
affects everyone. Keynes (1936) pointed to this in making the argument that the wise
policy was to maintain stability in the average level of nominal wages, while adjusting
real wages through a rise in prices over the short run.
13
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12. Kimura and Ueda (2001) find that Japan’s nominal wages were downwardly rigid when using data through 1998
from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare’s Basic Survey on Wage Structure. However, they also find that
this DNWR was nowhere to be found when using another data source through the first quarter of 2000 from the
Monthly Labor Survey, which is published by the same ministry.
13. See Keynes (1936, chapter 2, page 14), who says the following: 
Since there is imperfect mobility of labour, and wages do not tend to an exact equality of net advantage in
different occupations, any individual or group of individuals, who consent to a reduction of money-wages
relatively to others, will suffer a relative reduction in real wages, which is a sufficient justification for them
to resist it. On the other hand it would be impracticable to resist every reduction of real wages, due to a
change in the purchasing-power of money which affects all workers alike; and in fact reductions of real
wages arising in this way are not, as a rule, resisted unless they proceed to an extreme degree. There is a considerable body of economic theory written in the 1970s and 1980s 
to explain wage rigidity. This includes the long-term contract theories found in 
Fischer (1977a) and Taylor (1979). Both Fischer and Taylor showed that nominal
wages become sticky, since wage contracts are set for multiple years and those 
contracts are mostly staggered.
14 Long-term contract theory does not explain why 
nominal wages are rigid only in the downward direction, however. Furthermore, most
economic theory explaining wage rigidity addresses the (downward) rigidity of real
wages, rather than nominal wages, and thus does not explain why nominal wages are
downwardly rigid.
15
Exceptions are MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and Holden (1994). They argue
that DNWR is in part being caused by contracts and institutional features, both 
in an individual bargaining framework and in a collective agreement framework,
respectively. Allowing for the possibility of holdup, MacLeod and Malcomson (1993)
show that incomplete contracts which rationally induce efficient human capital
investments may generate DNWR. Holden (1994) introduced a European labor 
market feature in which production can continue under the terms of the old contract
while the parties are bargaining (holdout). He shows that when one incorporates this
holdout option in a strategic bargaining game in addition to strike and lockout
threats, holdout threats prevail under certain circumstances and wages become rigid 
in nominal terms.
16
As pointed out by Yates (1998), however, theoretical research on DNWR has 
not been intensively done, compared with the large body of empirical research. In 
this regard, the behavioral economics developed by Kahneman and others since the
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14. Such a long-term contract system is said to have been established in the United States in the late 1940s. Gordon
(1982) notes that because of the frequent strikes that occurred in the United States in the 1940s, multi-year 
contracts became more common as firms attempted to hold down the cost of negotiating wages. He also notes 
that many of these long-term contracts wound up being indexed to inflation, so that wages were increased when
prices increased. For example, in 1948 the United Auto Workers (UAW) and General Motors (GM) agreed on a
long-term contract that required a portion of price increases to be passed on to nominal wages as a cost of living
adjustment, known as a COLA clause. This was described by GM’s president at the time as “buying a long-term
contract by offering unions cost-of-living protection.” One may anticipate that if this type of wage contract, in
which price changes lead directly to nominal wage changes, become widely used, nominal wages would become 
flexible. In this paper’s Appendix, however, we point out the possibility that nominal wages would not become 
flexible under low inflation or deflation, even if there were an agreement on this type of wage contract.
15. For example, under theimplicit contract theory of Azariadis (1975), Stiglitz (1986), and others, real wages stabilize
at low levels as a consequence of the transfer of risk from risk-averse employees to risk-neutral firms, thereby creat-
ing rigidity of real wages. Akerlof (1980) and Solow (1980) focus on the fairness that people would think about and
argue that real wages could be rigid since a reduction of real wages considered unfair by people would harm workers’
morale and productivity. Furthermore, Solow (1979) and Yellen (1984) adhere to the efficiency wage theory in
which real wages become downwardly rigid because of the positive correlation between employee productivity and
real wages. The efficiency wage theory is justified by the shirking model (low wages harm employee morale) of
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), thegift-exchange model (firms offer employees the gift of high wages, in exchange for
the gift of high morale and productivity from their employees) of Akerlof (1982, 1984), theadverse selection model
(low wages will induce skilled employees to quit and make it difficult to hire new skilled employees) of Weiss
(1980), and the job separation model (high wages lower the job separation rate and help evade the sunk costs of 
hiring and job training) of Stiglitz (1974) and Hashimoto and Yu (1980). Summers (1988) marries the efficiency
wage theory with Keynes’ relative wage theory to explain the mechanism by which real wages resist declines and
unemployment increases even when there is a negative demand shock, since firms are concerned over a decline in
employee morale and therefore tend to emulate wage trends at other firms. As an explanation of why the extent of
real wage rigidity varies among countries, Bruno and Sachs (1985) point out institutional differences in the length
of wage contracts and the extent to which contract renewal is staggered, as well as differences in the level at which
wage bargaining between employees and firms is carried out (at the national, firm, or individual level).
16. We thank Steinar Holden for kindly providing comments on this point.1980s has received wide attention. It is said that behavioral economics provides 
a framework whereby DNWR and other seemingly irrational behavior can be 
rationally explained. Below, we will shed light on how DNWR can be explained using
a behavioral economics framework.
17
Although behavioral economics has garnered considerable attention since Kahneman
won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2002, it is still at the developmental
stage, and thus subject to substantial criticism, particularly on its methodology. 
For example, surveys are often used in behavioral economics to investigate people’s
behavioral nature, but these surveys are based on hypothetical events and not necessarily
indicative of the behavior that people would exhibit if that event were actually to occur
(Yates [1998] and Howitt [2002]). Another problem pointed out is that it is difficult
to generalize the results of a survey targeted at a limited sample, and that the survey
results would differ between, for example, a sample of students in the economics
department and another sample (see Rubinstein [2004]). Although this paper explores
the reasons for DNWR based on the principles of behavioral economics, one should
be aware of the criticisms of, and problems in, this field of economic research.
B. Behavioral Economics and Prospect Theory
1. A brief summary of behavioral economics
The following is a review of the essence of behavioral economics. Behavioral economics,
a field studied by Kahneman and others, is represented mainly by two broad frameworks,
“heuristics” and “prospect theory.” Both are derived from the large number of 
experiments that have tested the various hypotheses of human behavior. They suggest
that in general people’s judgment and decision making under uncertainty may differ
from those of the rational agents assumed in neoclassical economics. However, they also
find that people’s behavior is not totally irrational in the sense that their judgmental
biases are not completely random, but rather systematic.
“Heuristics” describes how there are certain systematic patterns in people’s decision
making when they face a problem under uncertainty. Kahneman and others suggest
that people do not make perfectly rational judgments based on all of the information
which is available, but rather make simpler judgments based on a more confined 
information set. They note that although this behavioral characteristic may lead to
“judgmental biases,” those biases are systematic and predictable. In addition, con-
sidering the cost of assessing broad classes of information, this behavior can be regarded
as bounded-rational. There are several types of heuristics, such as “representativeness
heuristics” (people tend to exaggerate how often a small sample closely resembles the
population or underlying probability distribution that generates the sample) or 
“availability heuristics” (people tend to overuse salient and memorable information 
from their daily lives and rely less on more statistical information).
“Prospect theory” provides a systematic description of people’s tastes, choices, or
prospects under uncertainty. As explained in more detail below, the essence of prospect
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17. The efficiency wage hypothesis introduced in Footnote 15 appears to be similar to the behavioral economics approach
to the extent that wages are not lowered because the wage cuts would harm employee morale. However, one major
difference is that the efficiency wage hypothesis argues that the level of real wages affects employee morale and 
productivity, whereas it is changes in (nominal) wages that affect them in the behavioral economics approach.theory lies in the properties assumed for the value function of economic agents under
uncertainty. In general, neoclassical economics assumes that economic agents have 
a concave and risk-averse utility function. In prospect theory, people’s utility does 
not depend on the absolute level of the outcome, but rather on the magnitude of 
change from a certain “reference point.” Furthermore, the value function is concave
(risk averse) for gains as neoclassical economics assumes, but it is convex for losses 
(risk seeking). Prospect theory therefore makes it possible to provide a coherent 
explanation for “anomalies” that are regarded as irrational and difficult to explain with
neoclassical economics.
2. Prospect theory (loss aversion, the endowment effect, and the framing effect)
We briefly explain why nominal wages become downwardly rigid by providing an
overview of several survey examples conducted in previous literature. Before moving
to specifics, we first explain three key notions of the theory:loss aversion, the endowment
effect, and the framing effect.
a. Loss aversion
Based on numerous experiments, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose the notion
of loss aversion. Loss aversion can be described in the value function v(x) shown in
Figure 2. In the figure, the horizontal axis is the outcomex, the vertical axis is the value
v, and the pointo is the reference point subjectively determined by the economic agent.
Under this value function, an economic agent values the outcomex according to what
magnitude the outcome deviates from the reference pointo. When outcomex is above
the reference point and the economic agent obtains gains, the value function becomes
concave (risk averse), whereas when outcome x is below the reference point and the
agent incurs losses, the value function becomes convex (risk seeking). 
61
Why AreNominal Wages Downwardly Rigid,but LessSoin Japan? An Explanation Based on Behavioral Economics and Labor Market/Macroeconomic Differences










Note: Based on Kahneman and Tversky (1979).Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2, the value of a loss is larger in absolute terms 
than that of a gain which is of equal distance from the reference point (v(x0) <
−v(−x0)). This reflects the behavioral characteristic of an economic agent
18 in which a 
marginal loss is felt more deeply than a marginal gain of the same dimension. In
prospect theory, this characteristic is called loss aversion. In addition, people tend to
value the outcomex less as it deviates more from the reference point. This property of
a diminishing increase in both gains and losses is calleddiminishing sensitivity.
This value function differs from the traditional expected utility hypotheses of 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Savage (1954) in two respects. First, the
economic agent values outcome x based not on an absolute level but rather on distance
from the reference pointo. Second, the assessment of value based on the reference point
differs between gain and loss, and the response to a loss is larger.
b. The endowment effect
Regarding the choice of a reference point, Kahneman and others introduced the 
concept of the endowment effect (see Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler [1990] for
details): once a person comes to possess a good, he or she immediately values it more
than before the person possessed it.
19 Kahneman and others use this endowment effect
to explain how an economic agent tends to place his or her reference point to the level
the agent currently possesses (or the status quo he or she faces), and tends to be more
averse to losses relative to the reference point.
c. The framing effect
Kahneman and others also found that two logically equivalent statements of a problem
could lead an economic agent to choose different options, a concept called the 
framing effect. An example of the framing effect is shown below. As described in the
example, people tend to assign different values to two logically equivalent phenomena
when the two phenomena are described differently. This is closely related to the idea 
of loss aversion explained above.
d. Example
Below is an example of a survey conducted on about 150 individuals by Tversky and
Kahneman (1986).
Survey example 1 (from Tversky and Kahneman [1986])
•Question A
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which
is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs
are as follows:
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18. For a specific example, the increase in value when gaining US$100 is not as great as the decrease in value resulting
from losing US$100.
19. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) conducted an experiment with university students. In the experiment,
some of the students were given campus mugs worth a few dollars and told to trade the mugs with the other 
students, including those who did not possess any mugs. The experiment showed that (1) the average price at
which the students were willing to sell their mugs was much higher than the average price that other students were
willing to pay to receive the mug, and (2) the trading volume was much smaller than the amount that would be
expected under neoclassical economics. Based on their result, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) suggested
that economic agents have a tendency to hold onto goods once they possess them.—If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die.
—If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and
a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die.
→ Answer: Program A =22 percent; Program B =78 percent.
In this case, although the survival rate is equivalent in both programs, many 
people choose the one-third chance of saving all lives in Program B over Program A,
which was certain to lose 400 lives. This can be interpreted as showing how people
place their reference point at the status quo, where everyone is alive (the endowment
effect), and try to avoid the certain loss of 400 people’s lives from that reference point
(loss aversion).
20
Meanwhile, a second group of respondents was given the same initial scenario with
the following descriptions of their program alternatives.
•Question A (same as before)
—If Program C is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
—If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be
saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved.
→ Answer: Program C =72 percent; Program D =28 percent.
Programs A and C are identical, as are Programs B and D, but more people chose
the first alternative, Program C, in the second group, the opposite of what occurred in
the first group. The only difference that can explain the different results is that
Programs C and D are described in positive terms—“the number of lives saved,”
whereas Programs A and B are described in negative terms—“the number of lives
lost.” Since the outcomes were framed in positive terms (a gain) in Programs C and D,
people’s decisions may not have been affected by their loss aversion behavior. This is a
typical example of the framing effect.
21
C. An Explanation of DNWR Using the Prospect Theory
Using the prospect theory framework explained above, a consistent explanation of
why nominal wages become downwardly rigid becomes possible. Below, we show the
behavioral features of both employees and firms by introducing some examples of 
surveys conducted previously.
1. Why do nominal wages become downwardly rigid?
a. Behavioral features of employees toward changes in nominal wages
Kahneman and others conducted a survey combining the concept of fairness with
prospect theory to find out why nominal wages become downwardly rigid during a
recession. The following survey is from Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986).
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20. As is shown in Figure 2, the value function is convex (risk seeking) when incurring losses, which is consistent with
the result that many people chose Program B.
21. When pricing goods for sale, a seller finds it better to offer a “cash discount” for not using a credit card rather than
charging a credit card surcharge for using one. This can also be regarded as a framing effect.Survey example 2 (conducted on about 100 individuals)
•Question B
A company is making a small profit. It is located in a community experiencing a 
recession with substantial unemployment but no inflation. There are many workers
anxious to work at the company. The company decides to decrease wages and salaries
seven percent this year.
→ Answer B: Acceptable =38 percent; Unfair =62 percent.
•Question C
A company is making a small profit. It is located in a community experiencing a 
recession with substantial unemployment and inflation of 12 percent. There are many
workers anxious to work at the company. The company decides to increase salaries only
five percent this year.
→ Answer C: Acceptable =78 percent; Unfair =22 percent.
In both questions, B and C, the firm has decided to lower real wages, after account-
ing for inflation, by 7 percent. The percentage of those responding “acceptable,” 
however, differed greatly. For Question B, only 38 percent of those surveyed thought
the wage-setting decision was acceptable, thus showing a strong tendency to resist 
nominal wage cuts. One interpretation of the result of Question B is that people placed
the nominal wage of the preceding year as their reference point (the endowment effect), 
considered the nominal wage cut as a loss, and thus felt the firm’s wage-setting decision
unfair (loss aversion).
22
In Question C, however, 78 percent thought the decision “acceptable.” This is a
classic example of the framing effect. People viewed the 5 percent nominal wage
increase as a gain from the reference point of the preceding year’s nominal wage, even
though it was actually a 7 percent cut in real wages. In other words, an environment
of 12 percent inflation framed a 7 percent loss (in real terms) as a 5 percent gain (in
nominal terms) and made many people view the nominal wage cut as acceptable. 
This phenomenon in which people tend to think of nominal wages rather than real
wages has long been referred to as money illusion in neoclassical economics.
23 Money
illusion, considered an irrational behavior in neoclassical economics, can be explained
rationally using prospect theory and its concepts of loss aversion, the endowment effect,
and the framing effect.
b. Behavioral features of firms
When employees follow a value function that is loss averse and use the preceding
year’s nominal wage as a reference point, it is probable that firms also tend to avoid
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22. Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky (1997) state that people tend to use nominal value from the preceding year as a 
reference point despite understanding the difference between real and nominal values because nominal values 
provide a more easily understood yardstick over the short run. In addition, the existence of nominal debt may 
provide one intuitive reason why employees exhibit such behavior. Postlewaite, Samuelson, and Silverman (2004)
show theoretically that when people commit to consumption at a certain point in the future, such as purchasing a
home, they tend to become more risk averse following this “consumption commitment,” and this in turn makes
them more likely to oppose nominal wage cuts.
23. Keynes (1936, chapter 19, page 271) refers to “the psychological encouragement likely to be felt from a moderate
tendency for money-wages to increase.” Tobin (1972), on the other hand, disagrees, stating, “An economic theorist
can, of course, commit no greater crime than to assume money-illusion.”reducing nominal wages.
24 This is because nominal wage cuts lower employee morale
and thus cause a decrease in the firm’s productivity, both directly and indirectly. If the
losses stemming from this productivity decline outweigh the benefits from reducing
nominal wages, a firm would hesitate to cut wages.
This was shown through research in Europe and the United States based on inter-
views and surveys of corporate executives and human resource professionals. This
research includes surveys of 19 large U.S. firms by Blinder and Choi (1990), 186 U.S.
firms by Campbell and Kamlani (1997), more than 300 U.S. firms by Bewley (1999),
26 U.K. firms by Kaufman (1984), and 179 Swiss firms by Agell and Lundborg
(1995). Most of this literature, including Blinder and Choi’s (1990) example below,
shows that firms exhibit an aversion to nominal wage cuts.
Survey example 3 (from Blinder and Choi [1990])
•Question D
Let’s say that unemployment in your area rises by 2 percent. One possibility is that 
you could reduce wages to take advantage of a larger labor supply. For this question,
assume that there is no inflation. Do you (as a manager) perceive this as acceptable 
or unfair?
→ Answer D: Acceptable =5 percent; Unfair =79 percent; Irrelevant =16 percent.
•Question E
The actual inflation rate is currently 4.4 percent, and let’s assume that your employees
are receiving yearly wage increases of 4.4 percent to keep up with inflation. If 
unemployment rises by 2 percent, one possibility is that you could reduce the wage
increase to take advantage of a larger labor pool. Do you (as a manager) perceive this 
as acceptable or unfair?
→ Answer E: Acceptable =47 percent; Unfair =53 percent.
According to Blinder and Choi (1990), many of the interviewed managers perceive
a psychological difference between “taking away (the nominal wage cut under zero
inflation)” and “not giving (a cut in real wages but an increase in nominal terms 
under positive inflation),” and thus employers view the former as having a more 
adverse psychological effect. These results can be also interpreted as demonstrating 
the framing effect.
Bewley’s (1999) interviews are also instructive as to the reasons for this behavior.
Roughly 70 percent of the firms he surveyed were seriously concerned over a decline in
employee morale caused by nominal wage cuts. When asked why this decline in morale
was a concern, many of the firms responded that they believed lower morale led to lower
productivity. Specifically, they noted that lower morale would not only reduce
employee effort and create a moral hazard, but would also raise monitoring costs.
In addition, the decline in employee morale due to nominal wage cuts may also
induce competent employees to quit.
25 This could be viewed as an adverse selection
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24. The argument here assumes an imperfect labor market in which nominal wages are set by a bargaining process
between firms and employees.
25. Blinder and Choi (1990) also note another loss from nominal wage cuts: the sunk costs associated with hiring and
training the employees who wind up quitting because of lower morale.problem. Campbell and Kamlani (1997) argue that the most important reason why
firms avoid nominal wage cuts is the adverse selection problem. Another result, shown
in Blinder and Choi (1990), is that many firms are concerned that nominal wage 
cuts would not only result in adverse selection as to the employees who quit, but 
also lead to adverse selection in hiring, in the sense that the firms would be unable to
hire capable workers.
It should be possible to keep competent employees from quitting by only reducing
the wages of certain employees rather than implementing across-the-board nominal
wage cuts. When Bewley (1999) asked this question, however, many firms indicated 
a negative attitude toward wage reductions for certain employees, since the feeling 
of unfairness about these reductions would end up leading to lower productivity 
on average.
2. Are nominal wage cuts ever accepted?
Are nominal wage cuts always regarded as unfair and never accepted by people? The
following survey provides a clue in regard to this question. Kahneman, Knetsch, and
Thaler (1986) conducted a survey similar to Questions B and C, but posited a change
in the firm’s profitability in their question: 
Survey example 4 (from Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler [1986])
•Question F
A small company employs several workers and has been paying them average wages.
There is severe unemployment in the area and the company could easily replace 
its current employees with good workers at a lower wage. The company has been 
making money. The owners reduce the current workers’ wages by five percent. 
→ Answer F: Acceptable =23 percent; Unfair =77 percent.
•Question G
A small company employs several workers and has been paying them average wages.
There is severe unemployment in the area and the company could easily replace its 
current employees with good workers at a lower wage. The company has been losing
money. The owners reduce the current workers’ wages by five percent.
→ Answer G: Acceptable =68 percent; Unfair =32 percent.
In Question F, a number of people regard a 5 percent nominal wage cut as “unfair.”
Even in an environment of a high unemployment rate, people set their reference point
to the current wage level (the endowment effect) and find it unfair if wages are reduced
from that reference level (loss aversion). 
On the other hand, in Question G, one can discern that DNWR is not a phenom-
enon that is seen in every situation. Note that the only difference between Questions
F and G is the firm’s profitability. However, this difference leads people to think a 
5 percent nominal wage cut as “acceptable.” This implies that people have a tendency
towardloss aversion, but they are also capable of finding a nominal wage cut “fair” and
accepting it, when their firm experiences a loss and needs to cut costs.
66 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/NOVEMBER 2007IV. Reasons Why the Extent of DNWR Varies across Countries
and across Time
In Section III, we surveyed prospect theory in behavioral economics and examined the
reasons why nominal wages could be downwardly rigid. Using prospect theory, one can
then explain consistently why nominal wages in Japan were downwardly rigid during
the 1990s. That is, under near-zero inflation, firms were reluctant to cut nominal wages
because of concerns over violating workers’ sense of fairness. We assume this happened
because it took a certain amount of time for both firms and employees to recognize the
deepness of the recession. This was partially due to delays in the banks’ disposal of non-
performing loans, and thus bankruptcies were uncommon for the first several years
after the bubble economy burst in the early 1990s. Furthermore, it was not until the
1990s that the unemployment rate climbed to an unprecedented level and persisted.
As shown in Section II, however, the extent of DNWR found in Japan during 
the 1990s was small compared to that of Switzerland, which experienced a similar
period of extremely low inflation and prolonged recession. Then, DNWR seemed to
disappear around the end of the 1990s in Japan. In addition, a comparison of time-
series data shows that there was greater downward rigidity after the mid-20th century
than before among the industrialized countries. Why does the extent of DNWR vary
across countries and across time?
In this section, we discuss the reasons why these differences across countries and
across time occur. In Section IV.A., we begin with a look at the reasons why Japan had
less DNWR than other countries in the 1990s, primarily by focusing on differences
between Japan and the United States in labor market characteristics and institutions.
In Section IV.B., we consider why there would be variations in DNWR across time
within the same country, and also examine why Japan’s nominal wages exhibited no
downward rigidity at the end of the 1990s. Our application of the prospect theory
framework below is aimed in part at seeking the reasons for these differences.
A. Differences across Countries
1. Employee reaction to nominal wage cuts
a. Firm-specific human capital and labor mobility
It is conceivable that differences in the extent of DNWR across countries reflect 
differences in labor market characteristics. Japan’s labor market, in particular, is 
characterized by such “Japanese employment practices” as seniority-based wages and
long-term employment, which might have made Japan’s nominal wages in the 1990s
less rigid than those of the United States or Switzerland.
It is said that since firm-specific human capital through on-the-job training (OJT)
is important, seniority-based wages and long-term employment contracts tend to be
prevalent in Japan. Under such conditions, it may be hard for an employee who has
accumulated firm-specific human capital to find another firm that assigns a high value
to that human capital. Thus, if the employee were to switch jobs he or she would be
forced to accept a large cut in wages. In other words, a high share of firm-specific
human capital leads to a large gap between the nominal wages paid by the current
firm and the expected market wage of a job search. In this case, it would be reasonable
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the expected loss, as long as his or her nominal wage level after the nominal wage cut
remains higher than the expected market wage. 
The high share of firm-specific human capital in the Japanese labor market has a
dampening effect on labor mobility and makes it difficult for job seekers to find a new
job. In fact, as shown in Tables 2 and 3, which exhibit labor turnover and the share of
long-term unemployed for different countries (the greater the incidence of long-term
unemployed, the lower the probability of being rehired), Japan has less labor mobility
and longer periods of unemployment than the United States.
26
This can be also explained within a prospect theory framework. As explained in
Figure 2, prospect theory says that people will set their reference point to the previous
year’s nominal wage and value the current year’s wage in terms of the deviation from
that point. In this context, suppose two workers, A and B, who each received the same
nominal wage last year, are offered nominal wage cuts as a result of a negative shock
that occurred this year. Depending on the share of firm-specific human capital,
worker A’s expected market wage is assumed to be equivalent to last year’s wage,
whereas worker B’s expected market wage is much lower than his wage last year.
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Table 2  Labor Turnover
Percent
Hirings Separations Labor  turnover
(a) (b) (a + b)
Japan 20.2 18.9 39.1
United States 64.4 61.8 126.4
Switzerland ———
Canada 48.2 44.4 92.6
United Kingdom ———
France ——58.0
Germany 31.6 30.4 62.0
Source: OECD,Employment Outlook,1996.
Table 3  Incidence of Long-Term Unemployment (12 Months and Over)
Percent
1990 1995 2000
Japan 19.1 18.1 25.5
United States 5.5 9.7 6.0
Switzerland 16.4 33.6 29.1
Canada 7.2 14.1 11.2
United Kingdom 34.4 43.6 28.0
France 38.0 42.3 42.5
Germany 46.8 48.7 51.5
Source: OECD,Employment Outlook.
26. The proportion of long-term unemployed is high not only in Japan but also in European countries. Another 
possible reason for this, in addition to a high share of firm-specific human capital, is the presence of generous
unemployment insurance in European countries.Figure 3 illustrates the hypothetical value function of worker A (the solid line;
vA(x)) and B (the dashed line; vB(x)), and shows how each worker values the loss that
would occur if the nominal wage cuts were accepted. In this figure, worker B’s aver-
sion to nominal wage cuts is relatively less than that of worker A, which means a lower
extent of DNWR for worker B. It can be concluded that this difference arises because
the disutility of worker B caused by the nominal wage cuts is relatively less than that
of worker A. Worker A may be able to maintain his wages at the previous year’s level
even after switching jobs, whereas worker B’s expected market wage may be far below
his previous year’s wage (or the current year’s wage level after the nominal wage cut).
Therefore, even when they use the same reference point (the previous year’s wage) in
the endowment effect, the value functions of worker A and B may differ in a way that
makes worker B less loss-averse than worker A.
To further support this point, we introduce the results of a survey
27 taken in Japan
by Ohtake (2002) to gauge how people choose between accepting a nominal wage cut
or possible dismissal. The survey and its results are as follows.
Survey example 5 (from Ohtake [2002])
•Question H
Assume that you are currently employed in a certain firm. The firm’s business condi-
tions have worsened, and management is considering two different ways to cope with
the situation. Which of the two approaches would you prefer? Please select one of the
two choices for each of the following three scenarios, I, II, and III. 
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27. The survey was conducted in February 2002 on 6,000 people, males and females, between 20 and 65 years of age,
and had a response rate of 32 percent.Scenario I) 1. A 5 percent cut in wages for all employees lasting two years. 
2. A 5 percent reduction in the number of employees through layoffs.
→ Answers: 1. Wage cut =86.7 percent; 2. Layoffs =13.3 percent.
Scenario II) 1. A 10 percent cut in wages for all employees lasting two years.
2. A 10 percent reduction in the number of employees through layoffs.
→ Answers: 1. Wage cut =81.9 percent; 2. Layoffs =18.1 percent.
Scenario III) 1. A 30 percent cut in wages for all employees lasting two years. 
2. A 30 percent reduction in the number of employees through layoffs.
→ Answers: 1. Wage cut =58.9 percent; 2. Layoffs =41.1 percent.
These results are consistent with people’s behavioral characteristics of loss aversion
explained in Section III, in the sense that a certain number of respondents chose to
maintain their wage levels by risking a layoff instead of accepting a nominal wage cut.
What should be emphasized, however, is that the majority of respondents chose across-
the-board nominal wage cuts over layoffs in all three scenarios. This result is consistent
with survey example 4 explained in Section III, as well as with the results of Kuroda
and Yamamoto (2003b), which suggest that large nominal wage cuts are possible in
Japan when business conditions are serious enough to necessitate layoffs.
28
Another point worth noting from this survey example is that the proportion of
respondents choosing the nominal wage cut becomes smaller as the size of the 
nominal wage cut increases. The choice between a nominal wage cut and a layoff is 
made based on the level of nominal wages after the cut and the expected market 
wage (which depends on the probability of a layoff, the probability of finding a new
job, and the nominal wage of the new job) if a layoff is chosen. We interpret the 
relatively larger number of respondents who preferred a 30 percent probability of
a layoff over a 30 percent nominal wage cut under scenario C as an indication that
many people believe the expected market wage would be higher than the wage at the
current job after accepting a 30 percent cut.
29
b. Form of nominal wage payments
The proportion of bonuses to total nominal wages is higher in Japan than in other
countries, and this is one possible factor contributing to the smaller extent of DNWR.
This can also be explained using loss aversion, theendowment effect, and the framing
effect as described in Section III. To see this, we look at another result reported by
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986).
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28. Since no equivalent surveys have been analyzed for other countries, it cannot strictly be shown based on the results
of Ohtake’s (2002) survey that employees in Japan react differently to wage cuts than do employees in other coun-
tries. Furthermore, if the same survey were to be taken under conditions when it is predetermined which employees
will be laid off, as under seniority rules in the United States, it is possible that the results would be different.
29. According to Kinro Seikatsu ni kansuru Chosa (Surveys on Working Life) taken in 2001 by the Japan Institute for
Labor Policy and Training, approximately 30 percent of respondents in their 20s answered that a wage cut was
acceptable to avoid becoming unemployed, whereas about 60 percent of respondents in their 40s and 50s gave that
answer. This result suggests that the tendency to tolerate wage cuts to avoid unemployment becomes stronger 
with age. This tendency may indicate that the value function of people in their 20s is less risk averse, as vA(x) in
Figure 3, than that of people in their 40s and 50s as vB(x). That is, the younger people accumulate less human 
capital and have a smaller gap between the expected market wage and the actual wages than the older people, 
and therefore resist wage cuts more strongly.Survey example 6 (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler [1986])
•Question I
A small company employs several people. The workers’ incomes have been about average
for the community. In recent months, business for the company has not increased as it
had before. The owners reduce the workers’ wages by 10 percent for the next year. 
→ Answer I: Acceptable =39 percent; Unfair =61 percent.
•Question J
A small company employs several people. The workers have been receiving a 10 percent
annual bonus each year and their total incomes have been about average for the 
community. In recent months, business for the company has not increased as it had
before. The owners eliminate the workers’ bonus for the year. 
→ Answer J: Acceptable =80 percent; Unfair =20 percent.
Although both questions describe the same situation, that is, a 10 percent reduction
in total nominal wages, the difference in how these total nominal wages were framed
produced different results. That is, in Question I the previous year’s total nominal
wages were set as the reference point, and a majority of respondents answered that a 
10 percent reduction in total nominal wages from that level was unfair. In contrast,
Question J describes the same phenomenon as “a reduction in the bonus that is added
to the base salary.” Since many people set their reference point to the base salary
(excluding bonus), a majority of people perceived the change not as a loss but as a
decrease in gain, and accepted the firm’s decision. When such a framing effect is made
effective by the fact that a bonus is an irregular additional payment, it becomes easier
to reduce total nominal wages by cutting the bonus in a country, like Japan, where
bonuses account for a relatively high proportion of total wages.
30,31
2. Institutionally driven firm behavior
As pointed out by Keynes, Kahneman, and others, employees do not continue to
stubbornly resist nominal wage cuts when business conditions become very weak.
Bewley (1999), based on worker and firm interviews, reports that workers found the
cost of gathering information on the deterioration of firm profits small, and that firms
found it less likely that employees’ morale would decline as a result of nominal wage
cuts if they were implemented when the firm was losing money.
Why, then, do U.S. firms prefer layoffs to nominal wage cuts?
32 Bewley (1999)
answers the question using the following results. First, because firms can choose to a
certain extent which employees to lay off, an adverse selection problem is unlikely to
occur. Furthermore, because the relatively more competent employees survive the 
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30. Another possible interpretation of this survey is that employees were likely to view the decision of no bonus
(Question I) as a temporary measure, but view the reduction in total nominal wages (Question J) as permanent,
and therefore possibly also affecting the basis for retirement pay.
31. The interpretation provided here is consistent with the results by Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a, b), which 
show empirically that it is relatively easy to adjust labor costs in Japan through bonuses, and that annual earnings
including bonuses were less downwardly rigid than regular monthly wages.
32. Under recessionary conditions, firms have a tendency to reduce overtime working hours before cutting nominal
wages or reducing employment (this is also shown by Kuroda and Yamamoto [2005] using Japanese data).
Accordingly, we will limit our discussion in this paper to the question of whether adjustments are made to wages
or employment once a firm has run out of room to adjust overtime hours worked.layoff and the morale of these survivors does not decline, layoffs have the effect of 
raising the average productivity of employees. Additionally, because layoffs also reduce
such fixed costs as fringe benefits, they have a fairly substantial downward effect on
labor costs.
A major reason that the morale of remaining employees after the layoff does not
decline in the United States may be that the order in which employees are laid off is
predetermined based on seniority, and thus many employees are not unnecessarily
exposed to job insecurity. In contrast, such U.S. layoff practices do not exist in Japan,
and a series of case law accumulated since the end of World War II has established a
legal regime that places strict limits on the dismissal of employees. It is conceivable
that strict employment protection legislation (EPL) provides one possible explanation
for Japan’s low labor mobility. The greater the firing costs, the more hesitant firms will
be in hiring and thus the less mobile the workforce.
Table 4 summarizes the results in OECD (2004), a paper that ranks countries
based on the strictness of their EPL. Under this ranking system, the lower the ranking,
the more difficult that country makes it for firms to dismiss employees. Japan, which
has a small extent of DNWR, ranks number 22 out of the 28 OECD countries in 
difficulty of dismissal, whereas the United States and Switzerland, both of which have
a relatively large extent of DNWR, rank at the top. That is, one can interpret the
results in OECD (2004) as showing that Japanese firms have limited discretionary
ability to dismiss employees and therefore need to cut wages to reduce labor costs. In
fact, looking back at Japan’s experience in the 1990s, there were numerous examples
of workers and firms coordinating and implementing nominal wage cuts in exchange
for maintaining job security.
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Table 4  Employment Protection Legislation Indices 
Overall strictness  Overall EPL
Difficulty of dismissal of protection  (ver. 1)
against dismissals
Japan 22 18 12
United States 1 1 1
Switzerland 3 3 6
Canada 6 4 3
United Kingdom 2 2 2
France 15 13 24
Germany 17 22 20
Notes: 1. Rank ordering of EPL strictness for the 28 OECD countries, based on indices compiled 
by OECD (2004).
2. Difficulty of dismissal is a measure of the strictness of standards for what constitutes legal 
dismissal of regular employees. 
3. Overall strictness of protection against dismissals is the difficulty of dismissal added 
to the complexity of procedures that a firm must comply with when dismissing a regular
employee (“Regular procedural inconveniences” plus “notices and severance pay for no-fault
individual dismissals”). 
4. Overall EPL (ver. 1) is a weighted average of protections for regular employees and 
protections for part-time employees.
Source: OECD (2004).This is also consistent with Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a, b), which showed that
in contrast with the partial downward rigidity of nominal wages for Japan’s full-time
employees, the hourly wages of part-time employees were almost perfectly rigid 
downward. In Japan, the jobs of full-time employees are generously protected by EPL,
but part-time employees can have their employment contracts terminated once the
contractual period expires.
33 This makes it easy for firms to cut surplus part-time
employees, and may bring nearly perfect downward rigidity to the hourly wages of
part-time employees who have effectively been continuously employed.
34,35
As assumed in the insider-outsider theory, however, when employment is strictly
protected by legislation, workers’ bargaining power is increased and wages are raised
above the level that clears the labor market (see Holden [1994, 2004], for example). 
As stated in Holden (1994), this phenomenon may be related to the tendency among
those countries that adopt strict EPL to also prohibit by law unilateral nominal wage
cuts by firms. One of the reasons why many European countries adopt strict EPL and
at the same time prohibit unilateral nominal wage cuts is that if the law allowed firms
to cut nominal wages without the employee’s consent, the firm could encourage an
employee to quit by implementing a huge nominal wage cut. This could be interpreted
as an indirect dismissal, which goes against the spirit of job security.
36,37
B. Differences across Time
We described above the possibility of explaining the extent of DNWR with labor 
market characteristics and other institutional differences. We turn now to the reasons
why DNWR appears and disappears within the same country depending on the time
period of observation. 
As explained in Section III.C, employees are capable of accepting a nominal wage
cut when their firm experiences a loss and needs to cut labor costs. Is it possible to
interpret the disappearance of DNWR in Japan from the end of the 1990s as the
result of macroeconomic conditions such as recession, low inflation, and deflation
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33. This can be also seen from the fact that Japan’s ranking rises to No. 12 if we focus on overall EPL strictness, which
is based on a weighted average of EPL for regular employees and for part-time employees, as shown in Table 4.
34. As also pointed out by Gordon (1982), another reason that Japan has less wage rigidity is the fact that in general
the term of wage contracts for full-time employees is one year, which is shorter than many other countries. As
noted earlier, wage contracts in the United States often cover multiple years, making it impossible for firms to cut
wages even if they suffer a negative shock during the contract period. This is in contrast to Japan, where the annual
shunto (spring offensive) presents an opportunity for wage negotiations between workers and firms every year. We
believe this greater frequency of opportunity to renew wages contributes to nominal wage flexibility in Japan. It is
important to keep in mind, however, that differences in the wage contract period explain nominal wage 
rigidity in not only the downward direction but in the upward direction as well.
35. Another possible reason for the downward rigidity of wages is the existence of labor unions. Nevertheless, 
although Japan’s labor unionization rate has been in a declining trend over the years, it is still not low when 
compared to the United States or Switzerland, and this suggests that the extent of DNWR cannot be explained by
the unionization rate.
36. Holden and Wulfsberg (2007) document the existence of DNWR for manual workers in 19 OECD countries, over
the period 1973–99, using data for hourly nominal wages at industry level. They conclude that stricter employment
protection legislation and higher union density lead to stronger DNWR. Dickens et al. (2006), however, studying
individual level data of 16 countries, do not find the same positive effect of employment protection legislation 
on DNWR.
37. In principle, the worsening of working conditions without the consent of workers is prohibited by law in Japan 
as well. However, a number of case laws have approved of firms’ unilateral deterioration of working conditions
including wage cuts, for the purpose of protecting the employment, when courts find the situation necessary and
reasonable, even after taking account of the deterioration of working conditions.altering how both employees and firms view nominal wage cuts? Or was this only a
large, one-time adjustment in response to a huge negative shock, with no real change
in people’s loss aversion in respect to nominal wage cuts?
Hanes and James (2003) state that the DNWR observed in most industrialized
countries later in the 20th century “reflects employers’ fear of damaging employee
‘morale’ by violating social norms and concepts of fairness” and does not reflect 
“a fundamental preference on the part of workers” as argued by Shafir, Diamond, and
Tversky (1997) and Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996).
38
In other words, there is a possibility that the social norm that “nominal wage cuts
should be rare” had been established in the second half of the 20th century as a result 
of a persistent positive inflation under which there was no need to cut nominal 
wages. Under such an environment, a nominal wage cut can be regarded as “unfair” by 
workers and thus firms, who fear damaging employees’ morale, would not immediately
cut nominal wages, resulting in nominal wages becoming downwardly rigid.
Social norms can change over time, however. Thus, it may be possible that a social
norm that is tolerant of nominal wage cuts could be established, depending on the
economic environment. As we saw in Section II, Figure 1 shows the high volatility 
of prices observed prior to the mid-20th century in comparison with later, as well as
the frequent reductions in nominal wages that accompanied these swings in prices. 
Under such conditions, employees’ resistance to nominal wage cuts and the extent of
DNWR may have been weak. To put this in the framework of prospect theory, the
increase in people’s disutility associated with the nominal wage cut might be relatively
small because the social norm that “nominal wage cuts should be rare” was not formed
prior to the mid-20th century. And the shape of the value function at that time might
have followed thevB(x) rather than thevA(x) in Figure 3.
39
How, then, should one interpret the disappearance of DNWR in Japan at the end
of the 1990s? One possibility is that, because of prolonged recession, people’s aversion
to nominal wage cuts gradually weakened along with steady erosion of the social 
norm that “nominal wage cuts should be rare.” Using a prospect-theory framework,
the prolonged recession following the bursting of the bubble changed the shape of 
people’s values function from vA(x) to vB(x) and gradually diluted their resistance to
nominal wage cuts around the end of the 1990s.
There is a possibility that, as deflation became more entrenched and nominal 
wage cuts started to occur, people’s perceptions changed gradually to accommodate
nominal wage cuts. The survey taken by Ohtake (2002) noted above might not have
produced the same results if it had been taken immediately following the bursting 
of the bubble rather than in 2002, by which time the recession had deepened 
considerably. In fact, looking back at the period from the bursting of the bubble until
the late 1990s in Japan, employees tended to think of nominal wage cuts as out of 
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38. As explained in Section II using Figure 1, judging from the long-term time-series data on Japan, the United States, and
the United Kingdom, nominal wages appear to have been flexible from the 19th-century until the mid-20th-century.
This observation is contrary to Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky (1997) and Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996), 
both of which argued that DNWR is a permanent phenomenon reflecting fundamental preferences of workers.
39. In addition, when prices and nominal wages are volatile, there is a possibility that the reference point becomes 
the real wage or the average value of nominal wage over the past several years, rather than the nominal wage of the
previous year.the question, and would not even have approved of a freeze in base pay.
40 Since 2000,
however, some unions have actually proposed lower wages than the previous year 
in the opening round of bonus negotiations, according to data compiled by the
Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo). This suggests the possibility that with
the recession becoming even more serious, employees changed their attitudes to 
recognize the inevitability of nominal wage cuts.
41
Furthermore, Japan’s unemployment rate rose persistently in the late 1990s to
reach historic highs, while the mass media reported frequently on corporate restruc-
turing. Under this environment, there is a possibility that employees began to consider 
unemployment as more imminent and overestimated the risk of losing their jobs. 
In other words, even if the risk of dismissal was actually small, employees might have
become more amenable to nominal wage cuts to avoid dismissal. Considering that
Japan’s unemployment rate had remained low and that employment adjustments 
were normally small up until the late 1990s, there is also a possibility that people
became overly sensitive to the rapid increase in unemployment and became more 
risk averse, thereby further weakening their resistance to nominal wage cuts in the 
late 1990s.
42
On the other hand, there is another way to view the disappearance of DNWR in
Japan from the end of the 1990s, suggested by Kuroda and Yamamoto (2005), which
is as a large, one-time adjustment in response to a huge negative shock. In other
words, the social norm that “nominal wage cuts should be rare” remained in place and
the shape of value functions was unchanged, but the nominal wage reductions at the
end of the 1990s were implemented as exceptional measures to avoid crisis in the face
of sustained recession.
Accordingly, the reason for the nominal wage cuts at the end of the 1990s differs
depending on whether the social norm that “nominal wage cuts should be rare” is
thought to have disappeared at the end of the 1990s or to have remained in place. A
closer examination of this question has important implications for monetary policy.
That is, the assumption that the social norm has disappeared implies that the Japanese
economy has been freed from the DNWR constraint, whereas if the social norm is
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40. In August 1998, the Secretary General of the Japanese Trade Union Confederation commented that labor unions
would consider a freeze in base pay, but many industry-specific labor unions strongly opposed the idea. Until the
bubble burst in the early 1990s, base pay increases were a common practice in Japan for decades.
41. Until recently, many firms have taken the approach of adjusting bonuses or reducing wages for a limited period of
time without actually changing wage schedules. In 2002, however, changes in management’s stance seemed to
occur. For example, Nippon Keidanren issued this statement in 2002: “Maintaining and strengthening competi-
tiveness precludes any further rise in nominal wage levels, and increasing base wage levels is out of the question.
Freezing or reviewing the annual wage increment in line with reforming wage systems is another issue that could
come up for discussion.” Therefore, there is a possibility in the future that drastic reform of the wage system,
agreed upon by both labor and management, would occur which imparts flexibility to nominal wages.
42. Prospect theory suggests that economic agents use their own subjective probability  (p) for the outcome with 
probability p, when they are forced to render a judgment. Specifically, the theory says that when probability p is 
low but not negligible,  (p) is overestimated, and that the risk is more likely to be taken if it is for a gain, but 
more likely to be avoided if it is for a loss. This type of behavior is frequently seen when taking out insurance. For
example, the probability of having an automobile accident is low but not negligible, and thus there is a tendency 
to overestimate this probability. In such case, many people will exhibit the risk-averse behavior of taking out 
automobile insurance to prepare for the unlikely event of an accident. This can be restated in terms of the risk of
job loss: if a company’s earnings deteriorate to the point where either dismissal or a wage cut is unavoidable and a
person feels exposed to the risk of job loss at more than a negligible probability, then many people will bear the small
price of an insurance premium (wage cut) to avoid a major loss (unemployment).assumed to remain in place, the implication is that nominal wages cannot always be
flexibly adjusted downward every time there is a recession in Japan.
To evaluate the nominal wage cuts observed at the end of the 1990s, however,
there is a need to wait for further data to accumulate. It is also important to be aware
that, given the difficulty of using data to answer the question of whether the social
norm that “nominal wage cuts should be rare” remains in place, a statistical test of the
two alternatives would also be difficult. For this reason, we do not seek here to judge
which is correct, but rather to merely state that there are two viewpoints on this issue.
V. Conclusion
Why do nominal wages become downwardly rigid? We proposed an answer to this
question based on a survey of the theoretical and empirical research.
This paper can be summarized as follows. First, in Section II, we looked at long-
term time-series data on prices and nominal wages to examine the downward rigidity
of nominal wages from the 19th century until recently in several different countries,
and found the following three results. (1) There is a possibility that in three countries,
Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom, nominal wages from the 19th 
century until the mid-20th century were more flexible than they were in the late 20th
century and exhibited no downward rigidity. (2) In the second half of the 20th century,
nominal wages in general were downwardly rigid in almost all the industrialized 
countries. (3) In the second half of the 20th century, the extent of DNWR varied across
countries, and Japan had less downward rigidity than other countries.
Second, we addressed in Section III the question of why nominal wages were
downwardly rigid by summarizing the theoretical literature and by presenting specific
examples from behavioral economics, a field that has attracted considerable attention
in recent years. The behavioral economics literature has shown that (1) people value
outcomes based on their distance from a reference point rather than on an absolute
measure, and (2) gains and losses from this reference point are valued differently, 
with losses evoking a stronger reaction (an indication of loss-averse behavior). 
This framework makes it possible to provide a rational explanation for why nominal
wages exhibit downward rigidity: people use their most recently received nominal
wage as a reference point and strongly resist any declines below that nominal wage
level. We also noted, however, that people are also capable of finding a nominal wage
cut “fair” and accepting it, under a situation in which their firm experiences a loss 
and needs to cut costs.
Finally, in Section IV, given the explanation of these characteristics based on
behavioral economics, we considered the reasons why there are differences in both 
the existence and extent of DNWR between time periods and/or from country to
country. We showed that differences in labor market characteristics (including level 
of labor mobility and employment protection legislation) and in macroeconomic 
variables (such as economic growth and inflation rates) could lead to differences in
how employees and firms perceive nominal wage cuts (social norms), which may alter
the existence and extent of DNWR.
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AND INDEXATION
As explained in the main text, one reason for DNWR is people’s behavioral tendency
to value the current year’s nominal wage using the previous year’s nominal wage as a
reference point. If wage contracts are price indexed, however, nominal wages could be
more flexible even when employees exhibit such a behavioral tendency. Why is index-
ation not widely used in wage contracts nowadays? In this Appendix, we survey the
history and the basic scheme of indexation, and consider why indexation has not
become more widespread.
A. The History of Indexation
Indexation is a way to link the amount of future nominal payments to the price level
when forming a wage or loan contract, thereby maintaining the real purchasing power
of the nominal amounts to be paid. As shown theoretically by Gray (1976) and
Fischer (1977b), indexation has the advantage of minimizing fluctuations in output
when nominal shocks occur.
43 Accordingly, the indexation of nominal contracts has
been recommended by many economists for more than a century, including Lowe
(1822) and Jevons (1875), and more recently Tobin (1971), Friedman (1974), Fischer
(1986), Bodie (1990), and Shiller (1997).
As far as the industrialized countries are concerned, however, the indexation of
nominal contracts has not been used as widely as recommended by economists.
44
For example, the use of indexation in nominal contracts in Japan is limited to public
pensions, where indexation was introduced in 1973, and to the inflation-linked
Japanese government bonds (JGBs), which were first issued in March 2004.
45 In the
United States, as well, there are some examples of nominal contracts tied to price
indices, including Social Security pensions from 1975, Treasury inflation-protected
securities (TIPS), which were first issued in 1997, and a portion of wage contracts.
TIPS, however, only accounted for about 4 percent of the total U.S. treasury bonds
outstanding at the end of June 2005, and the percentage of wage contracts indexed to
prices has declined in recent years to about 20 percent.
Although the prevalence of indexation in nominal wage contracts has declined in
recent years in the United States, over 60 percent of wage contracts were indexed
between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s.
46 Below, we review the U.S. experience
with nominal wage indexation to consider the extent to which such indexation can
contribute to increasing the flexibility of nominal wages.
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43. As will be explained later, it is important to keep in mind that one disadvantage of indexation is that it makes
adjustments to real shocks more difficult and thereby lowers economic welfare.
44. An exception to this is the inflation-linked bonds that have become prevalent in the United Kingdom. According
to the Debt and Reserves Management Report 2005–06, inflation-linked bonds (index-linked gilts) accounted for
approximately 23 percent of the total government bond issuance as of the end of December 2004. For research on
indexation in the United Kingdom, see Liesner and King (1975). 
45. The total issuance of inflation-linked JGBs as of the end of fiscal 2004 was ¥900 billion, less than 1 percent of the
total amount of JGBs outstanding.
46. Shiller (1997) noted that in the United States, the indexing of nominal wages to prices was widespread during
World War I, declined during the period of stable prices in the 1920s, and then became more common again 
during the period of high inflation in the 1970s.B. Indexation of Nominal Wages: Examples of Wage Contracts in the 
United States
1. Indexation schemes and the downward rigidity of nominal wages
In the United States, some nominal wages are indexed by adding a cost-of-living
allowance or cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) clause to the wage contract. When
the wage contract has a COLA clause, an allowance equivalent to the increase in the
CPI is added to the amount of wages paid to compensate for the decline in real wages
caused by inflation. Consequently, if the COLA fully compensates for the inflation
rate, the real wages of employees become independent of inflation.
Nevertheless, even if nominal wages are indexed to prices through COLA, a wage
increase is not always 100 percent indexed to inflation. For example, Vroman (1989)
uses U.S. data covering 1968–80 to compare the COLA actually paid to the inflation
rate, and found that the COLA corresponded to only about 60 percent of the inflation
rate. Bauman (1991) also showed that the COLA amounted to slightly under 50 percent
of the inflation rate in the United States in 1990.
47 Thus, the U.S. data appear to 
indicate that even when wage contracts included COLA clauses, the indexation of
nominal wages was not complete and nominal wages exhibited some rigidity.
Potential reasons for this include the presence of various restrictions within the
COLA clause on the amount of COLA payments and the use of a reference inflation
rate from a different time period. For example, Vroman (1989) showed that in many
COLA clauses, caps on the amount of COLA were established
48 or COLA was not
paid until the inflation rate exceeded a given threshold. Another reason, shown by
Jadresic (2002), is that the COLA is indexed to the inflation rate of the previous
period, rather than the current period.
The lack of a perfect linkage between nominal wage increases and the inflation 
rate even when there is COLA protection can also be attributed to the fact that if 
nominal wages were perfectly indexed to prices, firms would lose their ability to adjust
real wages in response to real shocks such as supply and technology shocks. Although
nominal wage indexation has the advantage of preventing nominal shocks from 
affecting real wages, it has the disadvantage of allowing real shocks to have a major
impact on corporate profits, output, and employment. For example, if prices of goods
increase in response to a negative supply shock, the entire increase in goods prices would
have to be reflected in a nominal wage increase under full nominal wage indexation.
This would make it impossible for firms to lower their real wages and lead to declines
in corporate profits as well as cutbacks in both production and employment.
49
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47. In other research, COLA as a fraction of the inflation rate was shown to be 0.49 by Douty (1975) and 0.48 by
Sheifer (1979) in the United States.
48. Card (1983) analyzed COLA clauses in Canada over 1968–75 and found that 30 percent of the agreements
capped the amount of COLA and in 90 percent of those the cap was reached.
49. Indexing nominal wages ensures the flexibility of nominal wages but causes rigidity of real wages. Accordingly, 
as shown by Friedman (1974), Gray (1976), and Fischer (1977b), indexation can only achieve macroeconomic
stability when nominal shocks are more prevalent than real shocks. For example, in Brazil during the 1960s 
and early 1970s, when nominal shocks led to persistently high inflation, it is understood that the indexation of
nominal wages and government bonds led to high rates of economic growth by suppressing capital outflows and
encouraging the accumulation of savings and capital (see, for example, Dornbusch [1997]). During the two oil
shocks in the 1970s following that, the countries where the indexation of nominal wages was more common were
less able to adjust real wages, and experienced more serious stagflation (for details, see Bruno and Sachs [1985]).This lack of full indexation of nominal wages to prices in COLA agreements in the
United States can be attributed to recognition by both labor and management of these
disadvantages to indexation and the need to leave firms with some room to adjust 
real wages in response to real shocks. Regarding this point, Shiller (1997), a proponent
of making greater use of indexation, noted the possibility that “the aversion to wage
indexation currently expressed by firms when negotiating with labor might be inter-
preted as a recognition of the importance of applying a little ‘grease’ to the wheels of
the labor market. Some obfuscation of the stark realities may help people to accept
changes in real income more easily.”
2. The relation between indexation and the inflation rate
Appendix Figure 1 plots the percentage of employees covered by COLA agreements
(the COLA coverage rate) at U.S. firms with at least 1,000 employees and the rate of
inflation. As seen in the figure, indexation has been widely used only during periods
of relatively high inflation. It is evident that the COLA coverage rate was high from
the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s, when inflation was high, but low during other
periods. Between 1968 and 1995, the correlation between the COLA coverage rate
and the inflation rate was high at 0.66.
One conceivable reason that the incidence of nominal wage indexation based on
COLA clauses declines as the inflation rate gets lower is that the need for nominal
wage indexation under low inflation becomes small because volatility in the inflation
rate is small.
50 Since there is greater inflation uncertainty during periods of high 
inflation, employees may use nominal wage indexation to protect against reductions
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50. Since this positive correlation between the level of inflation and uncertainty was pointed out by Okun (1971) and
Friedman (1977), there has been considerable empirical research on the subject, including Cecchetti (1987) and
Evans (1991), as well theoretical treatment by Logue and Willet (1976), Ball (1992), and others.
Appendix Figure 1  COLA Coverage Rate and Inflation Rate 

















COLA coverage rate (left scale)
Inflation rate (right scale)
Note: Inflation rate is year-on-year change in core CPI.
Source: Wasilewski (1996).in real wages brought by unexpected inflation.
51 Under low inflation, however, nomi-
nal shocks are less likely to occur, and therefore there is little need for nominal wage
indexation. In this case, it is easier for firms to respond to real shocks if they do not
adopt nominal wage indexation.
Several studies support the above argument. For example, Hendricks and Kahn
(1983) analyzed 5,570 wage contracts at U.S. manufacturing firms during the period
1969–81 and found a positive correlation between the COLA coverage rate and 
inflation uncertainty. Likewise, as shown by Holland (1986), there was a positive 
correlation between the COLA coverage rate and inflation uncertainty in the prior
year using U.S. data from 1961–83.
C. Indexation under Deflation
Considering that nominal wage indexation is unlikely to be widely used under 
low inflation, it also seems unlikely that the indexation can be a tool to enhance the
flexibility of nominal wages under deflationary periods, when DNWR becomes a
more serious problem. Below, we examine this point based on the experience in Japan
and the United States.
First, drawing once again on the U.S. experience, Fisher (1934) showed that 
nominal wage indexation was not common during the deflation of the Great
Depression. Furthermore, as explained by Bauman (1991) in a discussion of the design
of COLA clauses in the United States, COLA clauses often only addressed payments
to cover declines in real wages caused by inflation, without applying under deflation-
ary conditions. In other words, COLA agreements in the United States would not 
automatically lower nominal wages under deflation. This feature can also be observed
in the structure of U.S. TIPS. Even if deflation occurs and the adjusted principal
decreases below the security’s original principal, the U.S. Treasury guarantees payment
of the original principal. In other words, U.S. TIPS are structured asymmetrically in
the sense that real values are guaranteed against inflation but nominal values are 
guaranteed against deflation.
Second, in Japan’s recent experience with deflation, we found no examples of wage
contracts with indexation provisions as in the United States. Nevertheless, even in
Japan, the rate of inflation has been a critical determinant of labor-management wage
negotiations, particularly in the 1970s. Appendix Figure 2 shows the proportion of
firms that used the price trend (inflation) as an important determinant of wage
change. During the 1970s, approximately 60 percent of firms considered price trends
important and approximately 10 percent of firms considered the price trend the most
important. This suggests that a considerable number of firms indexed nominal wages
to inflation during the 1970s in practice, even though this indexation was not
expressly written into wage contracts. As the inflation rate declined, however, so did
the proportion of firms placing importance on the price trend when setting wages,
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51. Danziger (1984) showed theoretically how inflation uncertainty increases the uncertainty of real wages and thus
encourages the indexation of nominal wages. There is also research, including Fischer and Summers (1989) and
Ball and Cecchetti (1991), arguing that the causal relationship is one in which the greater use of nominal wage
indexing lowers the costs of inflation and thereby raises the inflation rate. Regarding this point, Holland (1995)
uses U.S. data from 1957 to 1990 to prove that the COLA coverage rate did not Granger-cause inflation.and under the mild deflation of recent years, in particular, this proportion fell below
10 percent. This suggests that very few firms lowered nominal wages solely because of
deflation, and that under deflation nominal wages tend to be determined based on
factors other than the price trend.
52,53
Further evidence that indexation is difficult to implement under deflation can be
found by looking at developments in the indexation of public pensions in Japan. When
Japan’s pension system was reformed in 1973, an indexation formula was introduced.
Under the formula, pension benefits were indexed to the CPI of the previous year, 
such that if the prior years’ CPI growth rate was 3 percent, pension benefits would 
be increased by 3 percent for that fiscal year. Since the prior year’s CPI growth rate 
has been negative since 2000, the amount of benefits should have declined from the
previous year under this indexation scheme. As it turned out, however, strong resistance
from pensioners led to the exceptional step of freezing indexation from fiscal 2000 until
fiscal 2002. Without this freeze, pension benefits would have declined by 0.3 percent
in fiscal 2000, 0.7 percent in fiscal 2001, and 0.7 percent in fiscal 2002, which corresponds
to a cumulative three-year decrease of 1.7 percent.
54 That is, even though pension 
benefits were indexed to prices, social norms dictated that pension benefits should not
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Appendix Figure 2  Inflation Rate and Fraction of Firms Placing Greatest Importance
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Percent Percent
Note: Inflation rate is the year-on-year change in the CPI (overall, after adjusting 
for the effects from introducing the consumption tax in April 1989 and from
raising the consumption tax rate in April 1997).
Source:Survey on Wage Hikes (Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare).
52. Important factors for firms when setting wages, in addition to the price trend, include corporate earnings and 
market trends in wage increases. Of these, the greatest proportion of firms places importance on corporate earnings
when setting wages, and this proportion has increased in recent years.
53. There is a possibility, however, that when deflation becomes severe the price trend may become a determinant of
nominal wages.
54. The indexation of public pensions was reintroduced from fiscal 2003, and public pension benefits were reduced by
0.9 percent in fiscal 2003 and by 0.3 percent in fiscal 2004, but the adjustments that were forgone during the
three prior years have yet to be applied.be reduced, and a strong aversion to reductions among pensioners led to a freeze 
on indexation.
Although this example from the public pension system cannot be directly applied
to the debate over the indexation of nominal wages,
55 it does suggest the possibility
that even though people accept nominal wage indexation under inflation, they are not
necessarily going to support it under deflationary conditions.
In this Appendix, we summarized the arguments concerning the indexation of
nominal wages, and showed that even when nominal wages are indexed, they do not
always ensure perfect flexibility. We also showed that indexation tends to be adopted
only when inflation is high and it may be difficult to implement under deflation.
These findings are consistent (over the short run) with the possibility of nominal
wages becoming downwardly rigid.
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55. As argued by Renner (1999), since public pensions are a contract between the government and people, they are by
nature different from contracts, such as nominal wage indexing, that can be traded on the market by private-sector
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